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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
1.)

The issue to be resolved on this appeal is whether the Honorable Dane H. Watkins

erred in reversing Judge Charles L. Roos's Order of Dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501(4) and
its constitutional counterparts.
2.)

Appellant Brett 1. Jacobson's ("Jacobson") position is that such error was

committed because the State failed to meet its burden of proving the requisite good cause to
justify the over six month delay from the date Jacobson plead not guilty, to the time of triaL The
following are the key factors that substantiate the foregoing point: (a) Jacobson twice invoked his
speedy trial rights and did so at the earliest possible moment in the proceedings; I (b) the reason
for the delay was Court error, as admitted thereby, and Jacobson did nothing to cause or

State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,260,16 P.3d 931,936 (2000) ("[I]fthe defendant has
demanded a speedy trial ... a stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause"); See also
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 902, 231 P.3d 532,547 (Ct. App. 2010) (A defendanfs assertion
of his or her right to a speedy trial is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right") (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
See also State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007) (,'[T]he timing
of a defendanf s assertion of the right tends to disclose whether a defendant actually desired a
speedy trial, and is closely related to and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice and
reasons for the delay").
1
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precipitate any delay in the proceedings;2 (c) no continuances were requested and no speedy trial
waivers were executed; and (d) most importantly, the prosecution offered no excuse or
justification, whether legitimate or not, as to why it was unable to bring Jacobson to trial in
Custer County within six months of his first not guilty plea or even within six months of
Jacobson's second not guilty plea, via counsel.
3.)

For the reasons set forth herein, Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court

AFFIRM Judge Roos's Order of Dismissal and REVERSE Judge Watkins' Memorandum
Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal.
B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
4.)

On or about June 28,2010, Jacobson was issued citations for Driving Under the

Influence (I.C. § 18-8004), Possession of a Controlled Substance (I.C. § 37-2732), and
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (I.e. § 37-2734A(1)).

2 State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d 1275, 1287 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The
ultimate responsibility for the delay must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant"). Compare Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289 {"The district court apparently
accepted the State's position, holding that the court's overcrowded calendar was a neutral factor
and would not be weighed against either party. The district court erred in this conclusion oflaw.
The duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution and
the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in a timely
matter") with Memorandum Decision Re Appeal, p. 7, fn.4 ("It is clear to this Court that the
mistake by the Magistrate that caused the delay was a neutral reason.... At oral argument, this
Court inquired of the parties on the issue of whether mistake was the fault of the software or
human error. This Court finds, in either case, it remains a neutral reason for the delay").
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An arraignment was held on the same day before the Honorable Charles L. Roos.

5.)

Jacobson appeared in person and entered a plea of "not guilty" on the record to each of the
foregoing charges. No trial date was set at the arraignment.
6.)

Thereafter, on July 7, 2010, the undersigned entered a notice of appearance on

behalf of Jacobson, entered yet another not guilty plea, and specifically demanded a speedy trial.
Jacobson also demanded a sworn complaint.
7.)

Despite entering two (2) not guilty pleas and making a formal request for speedy

trial, the State failed to bring Jacobson to trial within the timeframe elucidated in I.e. § 19-3501.
Specifically, with regard to the first not guilty plea, six months lapsed on December 26, 2010
(the trial was set for January 14, 2011); regarding the second not guilty plea, six months lapsed
on January 3, 2011. Accordingly, whether the six months is calculated from the first or second
not guilty plea, the State was in dereliction ofLe. § 19-3501(4).
8.)

On January 4, 2011, Jacobson filed a Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit of

Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and a Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss.
9.)

A telephonic hearing on the foregoing motion was held on January 7, 2011. The

Court granted Jacobson's motion.
10.)

As to the Court's reasoning, at the hearing, Judge Roos stated that the timeframe

to calculate speedy trial commenced on June 28, 2010, when Jacobson first entered a plea of not
guilty at his arraignment. This meant that Jacobson's trial should have been conducted by at
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least December 26, 2010

nearly three (3) weeks from the January 14, 2011, date on which the

trial was to be held.
11.)

As is required, Judge Roos's analysis focused on the reason for the delay.

According to the Court, when a not guilty plea is entered, ISTARS automatically provides a trial
date to the Court within the timeframe for speedy trial based upon the date ofthe not guilty plea.
12.)

However, in this instance, the Court entered a trial date based upon the time the

sworn complaint was entered

not from either of Jacobson's not guilty pleas. Recognizing that

the time of filing a sworn complaint has no bearing on speedy trial, the Court took the blame for
failing to schedule Jacobson's trial within the required timeframe.
13.)

The Court then entered its Order of Dismissal and the State appealed.

14.)

On July 6, 2011, Judge Dane H. Watkins issued a Memorandum Decision Re:

Appeal and reversed Judge Roos. Judge Watkins' conclusions are summarized on page nine (9)
of the decision:
Although Defendant, consistently and early in the proceedings,
asserted his right to a speedy trial, this Court concludes that
under the constitutional balancing test, a non-prejudicial delay
of less than three weeks did not violate Defendant's right to a
speedy trial.
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 9 (emphasis added).
15.)

Why the District Court relied on the "constitutional balancing test," is somewhat

perplexing. Jacobson"s moving papers and briefing made it quite clear that the primary basis of
the relief sought was

I.e. § 19-3501 and not its constitutional counterpart.
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16.)

In any event, the District Court reversed Judge Roos and entered its Order Re:

17.)

On August 8, 2011, Jacobson timely filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, an

Appeal.

Amended Notice of Appeal was likewise filed. Jacobson now submits this brief in support of his
appeal.

III.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did Judge Watkins commit legal error in his application ofLe. § 19-3501 to the facts of
this case?

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The appropriate standard of review is stated in State v. Moore:
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. While we
defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial
and competent evidence, we exercise free review of the trial
court's conclusions oflaw.
148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

This Court should reverse Judge Watkins because the State failed to bring Jacobson to
trial within six months of his not guilty plea and did not meet its burden of proving "good
cause'- for the delay
An accused has both a state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. Distinct

therefrom is I.e. § 19-3501. The foregoing provision is more properly understood as a statutory
right of dismissal when the time conditions of the statute are not met. See Idaho Trial Handbook
§§ 3:10-13. I.e. § 19-3501(4) states:
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The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown ... must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed ... [i]f a
defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has
not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial
within six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea
of not guilty with the court.
I.C. § 19-3501(4) (emphasis added); See also Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143,
150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative or
mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall "') (citations omitted).
Based on its text, the legal import of the foregoing statute is clear - absent good cause, if
a person is charged with a misdemeanor, those charges must be dismissed if the accused is not
brought to trial within six months of his or her not guilty plea. So much was stated by our Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Clark: "The statute mandates that unless the State can demonstrate
'good cause' for a delay greater than six months, the court must dismiss the case." 135 Idaho
at 258, 16 P.3d at 934; See also State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986)
("Our Supreme Court has indicated that when an alleged violation of the right to speedy trial is
in issue, we should look first to determine if the statute, I.e. § 19-3501, has been abridged ... If
the statute is applicable and there is no 'good cause' for the delay or the trial was not postponed
at the defendant's request, then the charge against the accused must be dismissed and the inquiry
is at an end") (cert. denied).
As to what constitutes "good cause," this Court's discussion thereof in State v. Moore is
instructive:
[T]he analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. But the
reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a
-6APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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good cause detennination may take into account the additional
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972). Thus,
insofar as they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for
the delay, a court may consider (1) the length of the delay;
(2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. However, the reason for the
delay lies at the heart of a good cause detennination under
I.e. § 19-3501.
148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544. Analysis of the Barker factors mandates reversal of Judge
Watkins' Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal.

Each factor will be

addressed in tum.
(a)

Reason for the Delay

This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Judge Roos admitted that the trial court
was the reason for the delay; both the prosecution and courts have a duty to bring defendants to
trial in a timely fashion; the prosecution did not provide a single reason or justification as to why
it could not bring Jacobson to trial within six months of his first or even second not guilty plea;
and based on the fact that Jacobson repeatedly invoked his speedy trial rights and the lack of any
evidence of court congestion or difficulty in procuring witnesses, the State's failure to bring
Jacobson to trial was not negligent, but reckless disregard for Jacobson's statutory and
constitutional rights. Notably, our appellate courts have stated that neither court congestion nor
difficulty in procuring witnesses, in and of themselves, constitutes good cause. 3 Accordingly,

3 Clark, 135 Idaho at 261, 16 P.3d at 937 ("Contrary to the magistrate's belief, this Court
has never stated that criminal defendants do not have a speedy trial right because of court
congestion. When examining the reasons for the delay, this Court has consistently maintained
that overcrowded courts are to be a 'neutral factor' which nevertheless should be considered
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the situation is such that the State could not even conjure up a legally insufficient excuse to
establish the good cause necessary to justify the delay, let alone any excuse at all.
As stated, the reason for the delay is the heart of good cause analysis. Moore, 148 Idaho
at 899, 231 P.3d at 544. In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to
different reasons. Id. at 900, 231 P.3d at 545 (citations omitted).

For example, a deliberate

attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the
State. Id. A more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the State rather than with the defendant. Id. While not compelling
relief in every case where a bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how
it has prejudiced him or her. !d. Although negligence is weighed more lightly than a deliberate
intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between
acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. Id.
One of the issues raised on this appeal is whether the scheduling error by Judge Roos was
a neutral reason for delay. In discussing the issue, the District Court stated that "[i]t is clear to
this Court that the mistake by the Magistrate that caused the delay was a neutral reason."
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 7. This is incorrect. In State v. Lopez, supra, this Court

since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
than with the defendant") (internal quotations omitted).
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reversed the District Court's conclusion oflaw that the trial court's crowded calendar was only a
neutral reason for the delay and did not weigh in favor of the accused. The Court of Appeals
offered the following reasoning in support of its position:
The district court apparently accepted the State' s position, holding
that the court's overcrowded calendar was a neutral factor and
would not be weighed against either party. The district court
erred in this conclusion of law. The duty to bring a defendant
to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution
and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that
cases are brought to trial in a timely matter.
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P .3d at 1289 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

As to case law that presents a factual scenario similar to the matter at bar, State v. Stuart,
113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (cited with approval in Clark, supra), is directly
on point and is particularly instructive regarding "reason for the delay" analysis. As is the case
here, the sole issue in Stuart was whether there was good cause under I. C. § 19-3501 to justify
the over six month delay in bringing Mary Stuart ("Stuart") to trial.
In Stuart, the State charged Stuart with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. On
May 8, 1984, the State filed its information against Stuart. In June, a pre-trial hearing was held
and the defense indicated that it would be filing motions to dismiss. The defense, the State, and
the District Court all agreed not to set trial until after the motions were resolved. However, after
the hearing, Stuart abandoned the motions. The State then moved the Court for a trial setting.
At the hearing, the Court scheduled trial for February 25, 1985. Also at the hearing, discussion
was had pertaining to a waiver of speedy trial. However, no waiver was ever memorialized
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and/or executed. In December of 1985, Stuart moved to dismiss the case pursuant to I.C. § 193501.
At the hearing on the foregoing motion, the prosecutor attempted to justify the delay by
stating that he had a heavy workload and that there was a change in judges in the case. The
defense was then asked if he had been prejudiced by the delay. Counsel responded that there
was no prejudice and that prejudice was not required to be proven under I.C. § 19-3501. The
Court stated that good cause had been shown due to the defense's failure to follow up on the
motions it abandoned. Stuart appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. According to the
Court:
The delay here was not created by Stuart. Abandoning a motion is
not tantamount to good cause for the delay. The reasons for delay
asserted by the state [increased workload], were properly rejected
by the district court. While we can appreciate the district court's
reliance on the representation that would be pursued, we cannot
understand why trial was not scheduled when it became clear that
the motions had been abandoned. The six month time limitation
for speedy trial under I.e. § 19-3501 does not represent a
whimsical timeframe. It is designed to accommodate a reasonable
number of pretrial motions ... Trial courts must be diligent in
securing compliance with time restraints. It is the court's duty to
arrange for trial ... We conclude that the court erred in failing to
dismiss the action.

Id. at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117.
In the present case, the "reason for the delay" weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. First,
the District Court erred in ascribing a "neutral reason" to the Magistrate Court's mismanagement
of its trial calendar. In Lopez, the Court concluded that because Courts also have a duty to bring
defendants to trial in a timely manner, failure in that regard due to a crowded calendar is not a
-10APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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neutral reason for delay, but weighs in favor of the defendant, and in this case, Jacobson.
Moreover, the degree to which this factor weighs in favor of Jacobson is significant. This is not
a case in which there was court congestion or difficulty in obtaining witnesses. Rather, the State
offered no reason why it was unable to bring Jacobson to trial in a timely fashion. This failure is
not just negligence on the part of the State

it is recklessness, made all the more egregious in

light of the fact that: (a) Jacobson repeatedly, and early on in the proceedings, demanded a
speedy trial, and (b) the facts of the case are quite simple. In these circumstances, the reason for
the delay cannot be not neutral. Rather, the reason for the delay, which again, is the heart of
good cause analysis, weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Judge Watkins committed error by
stating that the reason for the delay was neutral.
Second, Stuart controls the disposition of this case. Unlike in Stuart, in the instant matter
there was no agreement that the parties would delay setting trial until after certain motions were
heard; there was no abandonment of such motions; there were no questionable waivers of speedy
trial; there was no assertion that the prosecutor had a heavy workload; and there was no
switching of presiding judges. In short, there is nothing in Jacobson's case that even closely
resembles those circumstances present in Stuart. If the facts in Stuart do not constitute good
cause, it is jurisprudentially impossible that the facts of this case mandate reversal of Judge
Roos's Order of Dismissal.
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(b)

Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial

This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Whether a defendant invokes his or her
right to speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight; Jacobson twice demanded a speedy
trial; and Jacobson did so early in the proceedings.
Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that no factor is necessarily
determinative of a speedy trial violation, at least at the Constitutional level, it has also been said
that the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial is "entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right."

Moore,

148 Idaho 902,231 P.3d at 547 (citing Barker, supra, at 531-32). So strong is this factor that in

State v. Clark, our Idaho Supreme Court stated that regardless of the reason for the delay, where
a defendant has specifically demanded a speedy trial, an even stronger reason is necessary to
constitute good cause. As enunciated by the Court:
This means that, to whatever extent the delay has been a short one,
or the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial, or is not
prejudiced, a weaker reason will constitute good cause. On the
other hand, if the delay has been a long one, or if the defendant
has demanded a speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger
reason is necessary to constitute good cause.

Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Against the

foregoing legal backdrop, for the State to prevail in this case, it must both proffer a substantial
reason that rises to the level of legal excuse and, since Jacobson invoked his speedy trial rights
and did so twice, must set forth an even stronger reason for the delay.
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Adding to the State's difficulty is the fact that in detennining whether good cause has
been proven, the Court also looks to the timeliness of a defendant's invocation of his or her right
to a speedy trial. For example, a speedy trial right invoked early in proceedings is of far more
significance than a demand made later in the case. By way of illustration, in State v. Moore, the
defendant did not assert his speedy trial rights until approximately sixteen months after he was
arrested for misdemeanor DUl. After that, the defendant took nearly four months to file his brief
on the motion and later requested that a scheduled trial date be vacated. According to the Court,
"Moore's failure to assert his speedy trial rights until sixteen months after his arrest is a factor
that weighs against dismissal on speedy trial grounds:' Moore, 148 Idaho at 903, 231 P.3d
at 548.
Similarly, in State v. Lopez, this Court stated that the lateness with which Lopez asserted
his speedy trial rights weighed against him. In that case, Lopez did not assert his right to a
speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss, which was two days before the date ultimately
set for trial and seventeen months after he had been charged with three felonies. The Court
concluded that:
[t]he lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right weighs
heavily against his contention that the right was violated. That is,
the timing of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to disclose
whether a defendant actually desired a speedy trial, and is closely
related to and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice and
reasons for the delay. Here, the late assertion of the right weighs
significantly against Lopez in balancing the speedy trial factors.
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288.
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In the present case, Jacobson's invocation of his speedy trial rights weighs squarely in his
favor. First, not only did Jacobson explicitly invoke such rights, he did so on multiple occasions.
Second, unlike in Moore and Lopez, Jacobson demanded a speedy trial at the virtual outset of
this case. It belies common sense to think that a defendant's case should not be dismissed for a
violation of I.e. § 19-3501, when an accused demands a speedy trial, again demands a speedy
trial, does so at the earliest possible moment in the case, and is not brought to trial within six
months as a result of an error by the Court and State, both of which knew that a speedy trial had
been demanded, and neither of which came forward with any excuse, reason or justification as to
why the defendant could not be tried in six months on a factually uncomplicated case. Simply
stated, if there is no speedy trial violation in this case, there are no speedy trial rights in Idaho.
(c)

Length of the Delay

This factor weighs in favor of Jacobson, but admittedly less so than the above factors.
Regardless, the length of the delay is of less significance in statutory speedy trial analysis; the
delay was several weeks in length; the facts of the case are not complex; and, regardless of the
length of the delay, the State had two chances to comply with I.C. § 19-3501(4) and failed on
both counts.
Because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will
provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is necessarily dependent upon
the peculiar circumstances of the case. Moore, 148 Idaho at 901-02, 231 P.3d at 546-47. In
other words, the nature of the case is important in determining the period of delay that can be
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tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street cnme

IS

considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 902, 231 P .3d at 547.
In the instant matter, the length of the delay was approximately three (3) weeks. In and
of itself, this is not a significant delay. However, when compared with the fact that the alleged
offenses against Jacobson are relatively minor and the additional fact that Jacobson twice
invoked his speedy trial rights, a delay of three (3) weeks is less tolerable, especially when there
is no evidence of Court congestion, witness unavailability or any other reason which might
explain why any delay occurred at all.
(d)

Prejudice

This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. The burden of proving good cause is on
the State and the State did not prove that Jacobson was not prejudiced. It is the State's burden to
prove prejudice

not Jacobson's burden to disprove the same.

In its briefing, the State relied on State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 854,153 P.3d 1195, 1200
(Ct. App. 2006), wherein this Court stated: "If a defendant does not even attempt to make a
showing of a reasonable possibility of prejudice, this factor should be given a very light weight,
if any, for the defendant." The State's reliance on Avila was error. Avila is a constitutional
speedy trial case in which the Court simply balances the Barker factors to detennine if there is a
speedy trial violation under the minimum protections of the constitution. In stark contrast, under
I.C. § 19-3501, it is the State's burden to prove good cause and the State should likewise have
the burden of proving lack of prejudice. By relying on Avila, the State merged constitutional and
speedy trial analysis, thus resulting in an improper burden shifting to Jacobson, which violates
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the clear terms of LC. § 19-3501 and thus, explicit Legislative directive. So much is proven by
simply looking to the Court's ultimate holding on page nine (9) of its decision:
Although Defendant, consistently and early in the proceedings,
asserted his right to a speedy trial, this Court concludes that
under the constitutional balancing test, a non-prejudicial delay
of less than three weeks did not violate Defendant's right to a
speedy trial.
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 9 (emphasis added).
This is not the proper analysis under I.e. § 19-3501(4). Because it is the State's burden
to prove good cause, the State should be forced to point to specific facts indicating lack of
prejudice. It should thus not matter that a defendant initially did not come forward with evidence
of actual prejudice.

If the law were otherwise, defendants seeking to dismiss a case under

I.e. § 19-3501(4) would effectively have the burden of disproving that which it was never their
burden to prove in the first place.
Here, the State did not prove that Jacobson was not prejudiced. It merely guessed that he
was and attempted to shift the burden to Jacobson to prove otherwise. This may be appropriate
under a Constitutional analysis of speedy trial. It is not appropriate, however, when the case is
governed by a Legislative directive that states that it is the government's burden to prove good
cause. As such, in light of the absence of evidence that Jacobson was not prejudiced, this factor
also weighs in favor of Jacobson and in favor of dismissal.
In sum, all but one of the Barker factors strongly mandates dismissal. Based on the
foregoing analysis, Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the decision of Judge
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Roos and REVERSE the decision filed by Judge Watkins, thereby dismissing all charges against
Jacobson.
B.

This Court should reverse Judge Watkins under the following additional points, which
were raised by the State in front of Judge Watkins.
(a)

The fact that a sworn complaint was demanded does not restart the time period for
calculating speedy trial

Before Judge Watkins, the State argued that the filing of the sworn complaint after
Jacobson pled not guilty at his arraignment and not guilty through counsel, somehow operated to
restart the time period for speedy trial. This is not the case since the sworn complaint filed did
not add any new offenses and Jacobson already twice pled not guilty to the charges contained in
the misdemeanor citations, with his first plea occurring in open court at Jacobson's arraignment.
This Court has stated that "the time limitation [for speedy trial] is not renewed absent a formal
dismissal and refiling of the original charges." State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d
1275, 1283 (Ct. App. 2001).
Moreover, speedy trial is not concerned with the time that a complaint is filed. It is
concerned solely with when an individual first pleads not guilty. As such, for purposes of
determining speedy trial, the time a formal complaint is filed is superfluous.
Additionally, the State, at least below, put too much stock into the function of a
complaint. In the typical case, a sworn complaint is requested simply to isolate the charges and
acts alleged to constitute a violation of the relevant code provisions. Often times, complaints are
provided as late as the day of trial. A party is not required to enter an additional plea in response
if they have already pled not guilty to a charging document, such as a citation. See Misdemeanor
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Criminal Rule ("MCR") 3 ("A person may be charged and brought before a court for any citable
offense upon the filing of an Idaho Uniform Citation"). Moreover, if the case were that a sworn
complaint could restart speedy trial, a prosecutor in any case in which the defendant was charged
by citation could simply issue a sworn complaint and thereby restart the clock for speedy trial.
This would eviscerate I.C. § 19-3501 and the constitutional guarantees of a right to a speedy
trial.
(b)

The fact that Jacobson filed an extension ohime to file pre-trial motions does not
constitute any sort of waiver of Jacobson's right to a speedy trial

An extension of time to file motions does not push out the time period by which a trial is
to occur. It simply allows for additional time to examine discovery to adequately set forth
potential motions to suppress or motions in limine and has no bearing on the trial date. Stuart,
113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117 ("The six month time limitation for speedy trial under
I.C. § 19-3501 does not represent a whimsical timeframe.

It is designed to accommodate a

reasonable number of pretrial motions '" Trial courts must be diligent in securing compliance
with time restraints"). Moreover, since ISTARS automatically provides a trial date irrespective
of such a motion, it is impossible that Jacobson's motion had any bearing on when the trial date
was actually set. In fact, as the cause of the delay was the fact that the court clerk entered the
wrong day from which to start speedy trial, it is undisputed that Jacobson's motion had no
bearing on the date on which the Court set the trial.
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(c)

The fact that the Motion to Dismiss was filed within the timeframe by which pretrial motions were to be filed is not significant

I.C. § 19-3501(4) states that charges must be dismissed if the State fails to bring a
defendant to trial within six months of the entry of a plea of not guilty. The lower court's trial
order stated that pre-trial motions must be filed within twenty (20) days of the trial. The State
argues that because Jacobson did not submit his motion in advance of the cut-off date, the
motion should not have been heard. This is incorrect. First, the State' s argument would have the
effect of having Judge Roos's trial order trump legislative and constitutional directive, both at
the state and federal level. This aggrandizes court orders over state statute and constitutional
law. In addition, if statutes and the constitution had to cede to trial orders, this would be a

de facto amendment of I. C. § 19-3501 (4). The net effect would be that a party could assert his
right to a speedy trial only if: (a) six (6) months lapsed, and (b) if filing a motion to dismiss did
not violate the trial court's trial/scheduling order. This is not the law of Idaho and cannot have
been the intent ofthe drafters. As such, the State's argument lacks merit.
C.

This Court should reverse Judge Watkins because the reasoning and analysis adopted
improperly merges constitutional and statutory speedy trial law
Judge Watkins' reasoning and the trajectory of this Court has been toward treating

statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights as co-extensive.

Even the most cursory

examination of the genealogy of I.C. § 19-3501 jurisprudence bears out the slow and subtle
erosion of statutory speedy trial rights to the point where analysis thereunder is, in fact, one in
the same as that applied under the constitution. By way of recall, I.C. § 19-3501(4) states:
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The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown '" must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed '" [i]f a
defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has
not been postponed upon his application.
I.e. § 19-3501(4). The foregoing provision's constitutional counterpart provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy ... trial."
In detennining if a Constitutional violation occurred, our Court of Appeals applies a
balancing test involving the four (4) factors discussed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972). However, as to I.e. § 19-3501(4), the Barker factors were originally oflimited relevance
as the intent of the Legislature appears to have been to codify a statutory variant of speedy trial
rights stricter than the minimum protections afforded by its constitutional predecessor. See e.g.

Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 16 P.3d at 934 ("[U]nder I.e. § 19-3501, criminal defendants are given
additional protection beyond what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions");

See also Moore, 148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544 ("Since it is a stricter standard, we will
address the statutory speedy trial issue"). In fact, in cases following Barker v. Wingo, our Idaho
Supreme Court expressly stated that the Barker factors were of no relevance to statutory speedy
trial analysis:
The district court mistakenly applied the four-fold balancing test
for speedy trial claims enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo, supra, in denying appellant's motion to
dismiss. This ignores the legislative supplementation of the Idaho
constitutional guarantee. I.C. § 19-3501. Barker v. Wingo, supra,
is not applicable when I.e. § 19-3501 has been violated. The
district court should have applied I.C. § 19-3501 and dismissed the
action on that basis.

State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202, 579 P.2d 697,699 (1978).
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Based on this Courts' recent decisions, Hobson is effectively no longer good law. By
way of recall, in State v. Moore, this Court quite literally stated the opposite of the position taken
by the Supreme Court in Hobson:
[T]he analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. But the
reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a
good cause determination may take into account the additional
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972). Thus,
insofar as they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for
the delay, a court may consider (1) the length of the delay;
(2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. However, the reason for the
delay lies at the heart of a good cause determination under
I.e. § 19-3501.
148 Idaho 899, 231 P.3d at 544 (internal citations omitted).
As near as can be gleaned, the only difference in speedy trial analysis under I.C. § 193501 and state Constitution is that under the statutory analysis, the Barker factors "may" be
applied.

Moore, 148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544 ("Thus, insofar as they bear on the

sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay, a court may consider ... [the remaining Barker
factors r). Additionally, the reason for the delay appears to take on heightened significance. Id.
However, this difference is illusory. Despite the permissive language adopted in determining
whether the Barker factors should be considered in determining "good cause," the practical
reality is that this Court applies the Barker factors as a matter of course. The validity of this
point is borne out of simply looking to the analysis this Court has applied over the years. See
State v. Lopez, supra (applying: (a) length of delay, (b) assertion of speedy trial rights, (c) reason

for the delay, and (d) prejudice in determining if defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights
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had been violated); See also State v. Livas, 147 Idaho, 547, 550, 211 P .3d 792, 795 (CL App.
2009) (relying heavily on the Barker factors despite applying a statutory speedy trial analysis);

See also Moore, 148 Idaho at 900,231 P.3d at 545 (applying the Barker factors to a claim for
speedy trial analysis under I.e. § 19-3501 and doing so in the precise same analytical format as
in Lopez).
Based on the foregoing authorities, it cannot honestly be said that under I.C. § 19-3501,
the Barker factors are only permissibly applied or that the statutory speedy trial standard is
stricter than the constitutional speedy trial standard. In application, they have become one in the
same. Such gradual evisceration, from Hobson, to Clark, to Lopez, and finally, Moore, rings
eerily similar to the now famous admonition of Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) as pertains to the Fourth Amendment:
Since then, in case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual
but determined strangulation of the rule. It now appears that the
Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete.
468 U.S. at 928-29.
It seems apparent that in enacting I.C. § 19-3501, our lawmakers intended to pass speedy

trial laws stronger than the minimum protections afforded under state and federal constitutions.
Since Hobson, our appellate courts have slowly distanced themselves from this intent. Jacobson
invites the Court to re-examine its analysis of statutory speedy trial rights, but reiterates that if
this Court declines to revisit the issue, Jacobson still prevails under State v. Moore and State v.

Stuart.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM Judge Roos's Order of Dismissal
and REVERSE Judge Watkins' Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2011.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Attorney for Appellant
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